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DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Trades Council: SUPREME COURT
CLARIFIES THE PROVISO TO
§8(6)(4) WHICH ALLOWS UNIONS
TO CONDUCT INFORMATIONAL
ACTIVITY.
In DeBartolo Corp. fl. Fla. Gulf Coast
Trades Council, __ U.S. _ , 108 S. Ct.
1392 (1988), the United States Supreme
Court, on a petition for certiorari, ruled
that peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied
by picketing, urging a consumer boycott
of a neutral employer was not coercive and
therefore not a violation of § 8(bX4) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
The Florida Gulf Coast Building and
Construction Trades Council (union)
peacefully handbilled the customers of a
shopping mall asking them not to shop at
any of the mall's stores. The union's dispute was with a construction company, for
one of the mall's tenants, whom they alleged paid substandard wages and fringe benefits to workers. The union hoped to
influence the merchants, through a consumer boycott, to put pressure on the construction company.
The owner of the mall, the Edward J.
DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo), filed
a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charging an unfair
labor practice pursuant to § 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relatons Act (NLRA).
The NLRB ruled that the union did not
violate the act because handbilling was
under the proviso for consumer publicity
used to inform a distributor's customers
that the manufacturer or producer of merchandise was involved in a labor dispute.
The ruling was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. However,
the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and remanded the case because
the proviso to § 8(b)(4) did not cover the
situation where the mall merchants do not
distribute the construction company's pr~
ducts. The Court asked for a determination of whether the hand billing fell within
the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), and, if so,
whether it was protected by the first
amendment. Id. at ----> 108 S. Ct. 1392.
The NLRB reversed itself on remand
and decided that there was a violation of §
8(b)(4) because "handbilling and other
activity urging a consumer boycott constituted coercion." Id. However, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had
serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4)
could constitutionally ban peaceful handbilling not involving nonspeech elements
and reversed the NLRB using the Supreme
Court's reasoning in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, Id. Due to important
labor and constitutional law issues, the

Court granted certiorari and affirmed.
Although the NLRB's interpretations of
the NLRA are normally entitled to deference, under the "Catholic Bishop's Rule",
where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless
such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress. Id. at - 0 108 S.
Ct. 1397. The NLRB's construction of the
statute, as applied in this case, posed
serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)(4)
under the First Amendment. Id.
The handbilling was peaceful, truthfully
told customers about an existing labor dispute, and did not involve picketing. Similar acts by the union, such as generally
discussing low wages via literature distributed in town or radio advertisements,
would not violate the statute and would be
protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, handbills discussing a specific wage
dispute should be equally protected. To
hold otherwise "would require deciding
serious constitutional issues." Id. at __,
108 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
Next the Court reviewed whether Congress intended to ban handbilling under §
8(b)(4). The legislative history, however,
clearly showed that a "union can hand out
handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all
publicity short of ambulatory picketing in
front of a secondary site." Id. at __, 108
S. Ct. at 1404.
The decision in DeBartolo establishes
that the proviso to § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act is a clarification
which allows unions to conduct informational activity short of picketing. Ii The
proviso need not be treated as establishing
an exception to an otherwise all encompassing NLRA prohibition on publicity.
Rather it provides protection from communication, such as picketing, which
would be considered coercive.

-Andrea White Steele

Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n:
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A
STATE MAY NOT CATEGORICALLY PROHIBIT TARGETED, TRUTHFUL AND NONDECEPTIVE
LAWYER ADVERTISING.
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,
_U.S ......., 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988), the
United States Supreme Court held that a
state may not, consistent with the first and
fourteenth amendments, categorically pr~
hibit lawyers from soliciting legal business
for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and
nondeceptive letters to potential clients
known to face a particular legal problem.
In 1985 Shapero, a member of the Kentucky Bar, sought the Kentucky Attorneys
Advertising Commission's approval of a
letter that he proposed to send to potential
clients who had pending foreclosure
actions. In part the proposed letter stated
that "you may be about to lose your
home," that "[f]ederallaw may allow you
to keep your home by ORDERING your
creditor [sic] to STOP," that "[y]ou may
call my office for FREE information," and
that "[i]t may surprise you what I may be
able to do for you." The Commission did
not find the letter to be false or misleading
but found it contrary to the existing Kentucky Supreme Court rule which prohibits direct mailing to specific individuals as
distinguished from mailing to the general
public. 108 S. Ct. at 1919. The Commission, citing Zauderer v. Office of Dis·
ciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985),
offered its view that the Kentucky rule vi~
lated the first amendment and recommended that it be changed. 108 S. Ct. at
1920.
Shapero then sought an advisory opinion as to the rule's validity from the Kentucky
Bar
Association's
Ethics
Committee. The Committee indicated
that the rule was consistent with the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Rule 7.3. After reviewing the Committee's
opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court,
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